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Poor in natural resources, Japan has long been dependent on overseas supply for
most of her raw material and fuel requirements. While imports of raw materials
and fuel by the United States and West Germany in 197o accounted respectively for
14 per cent and 22 per cent of their total imports, Japan's imports of raw materials
and fuel in the same year amounted to about 59 per cent of her total imports. In
addition, Japan depends on imports from foreign countries for ioo per cent of her
wool, raw cotton, and nickel; 98 per cent of her petroleum; 95 per cent of her iron
ores; and 55 per cent of her industrial coal. Such being the case, one of the guiding
principles in Japan's foreign trade policy has been to expand trade with any country,
regardless of its political system.
Japan was plagued by a gap between her economic growth and her international
balance of payments until the mid-i96o's and, in order to improve this situation,
promotion of exports was given highest priority. Thus, efforts have been made to
expand trade with the Soviet Union and East European countries on a commercial
basis.
After the resumption of private foreign trade in 1949, trade between Japan and
the Soviet Union and East European countries was conducted at a low level for
some time. However, since the conclusion of a treaty of commerce and an agreement on trade and payment with the Soviet Union in 1957, and the conclusion of
treaties of commerce with Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1958 and 1959, Japan's trade
with Eastern Europe has increased yearly. In i97o , the total of Japanese trade with
this area broke the $i billion mark ($822 million in trade with the Soviet Union, and
S218 million in trade with East European countries). However, these figures account
for only 22 per cent and o.6 per cent respectively of Japan's total world trade in
1970. Compared to the figures for Japanese trade with the United Kingdom and
West Germany-$. 5 billion and $3.6 billion respectively-they are still at a relatively
low level.
As can be seen from Table I, Japan's imports from the Soviet Union have continued to exceed its exports to that country. However, while exports from Japan to
the Soviet Union have expanded steadily in recent years, imports to Japan from the
Soviet Union have shown little increase. The primary reason for such a trend can be
explained by the fact that while machinery, plants, steel products, and plastic and
* Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Japan.
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consumer goods have steadily been exported from Japan in response to Soviet demands generated by the implementation of -theproject for developing Siberia (Project
for the Development of the Forest Resources in the Far East), a recession in Japan,
and an increased internal demand for energy together with a shortage of transportation facilities in the Soviet Union have caused the reduction of imports from
the latter.
TABLE I
JAPANEsE-SovIET TRADE
Share in the

Share in the

Share in the

Total World

Total World

East-West Trade

Trade of Japan

(%)

Year

Export
(in millions
of dollars)

1967
1968
1969
1970
1971

158
179
268
341
377

Import
(in millions
of dollars)
454
464
461
481
496

Export

Import

1.5
1.3
1.6
1.8
1.6

4.5
3.5
2.9
2.5
2.5

Trade of the
Soviet Union (%)

of the
Soviet Union (%)

Import
from
Japan

Export
to
Japan

Import
from
Japan

Export
to
Japan

1.9
2.0
2.6
2.9

3.7
3.7
3.0
3.0

6.4
6.1
7.3
8.4

10.8
11.2
9.0
8.6

-

-

-

-

TABLE II
JAPAN'S TRADE WITH EASTERN EUROPE

(EXCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION)

Year

Export
(in millions
of dollars)

Import
(in millions
of dollars)

1967 ........................
1968 ........................
1969 ........................
1970.........................
1971 .........................

71
54
74
107
159

108
109
113
111
83

Share in the Total World
Trade of Japan (%)
Export

Import

0.7
0.4
0.5

0.9
0.8
0.8
0.6
0.4

0.6
0.7

While exports from Japan to the Soviet Union are likely to show a steady increase

for the future, those factors restraining imports from the Soviet Union will not
be overcome for some time, and Soviet imports are expected to continue to be
sluggish. As a result, the past trend in Japanese-Soviet trade relations, that is, an
excess of imports over exports on the Japanese side, is expected to further improve so
far as Japan is concerned.
On the whole, Japan's trade with East European countries has expanded smoothly
(Table II). In 1971, exports and imports combined totaled $242 million, showing an
increase of ii per cent over the previous year. However, while the export portion
of the total trade increased remarkably by 48.6 per cent, to $i59 millon, the import
portion declined by $83 million, or 74.8 per cent of the figure for 1970. The favorable
trend in exports was due primarily to the increase in' the export of steel and
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machinery. Increases were particularly noticeable in exports to Poland, Rumania,
and East Germany. On the other hand, imports from East European countries have
weakened somewhat since 1968, owing primarily to the decrease in the import of
crude oil from Rumania, and of pig iron from Poland and East Germany.
East Europe is geographically remote from Japan. For this reason, imports from
East European countries are limited to such items as agricultural products, mineral
fuel, and machinery. Moreover, these countries are lacking in foreign currency. All
of these factors are responsible for trade between Japan and East European countries
having failed to attain a satisfactory level.
I
FORMAL TRADE ARRANGEMENTS

A. Most-Favored-Nation Treatment

In 1957, immediately after the resumption of diplomatic relations with the socialist
states of East Europe, Japan concluded a treaty of commerce with the Soviet Union.
With this as a start, Japan proceeded to conclude treaties of commerce with Poland
and Czechoslovakia in 1958 and 1959, and with Rumania and Bulgaria in 1969 and
1970. At present, Hungary is the only East European country with which Japan has
diplomatic relations and yet has not concluded a treaty of commerce.
The primary characteristics of these treaties of commerce are almost identical.
They provide for mutual most-favored-nation treatment with regard to customs
duties, other export and import charges, internal taxes, and matters related to shipping, including departure and entry of merchant vessels. This is in contrast to EastWest relations generally. Western countries, even when they give either de jure or
de facto MFN treatment to East European countries with regard to customs duties
and other matters, do not include the products of these countries in their import
liberalization measures, thus discriminating against imports from these countries.
The Western countries make such discriminations lest the East European countries
export their goods at low prices fixed in disregard of production costs, and thus
disturb markets in the West. It is said, furthermore, that the Western countries
maintain such discriminatory measures as bargaining instruments for future negotiations with Eastern Europe. Japan, however, has taken no discriminatory measures
against these countries, which, though it may sound paradoxical, has strengthened
Japan's bargaining position. Japan has often emphasized this independent attitude
in various talks with both the East and the West.
B. Scheme of Tariff Preferences
The Japanese scheme of tariff preferences for developing countries came into
effect in October, 1971, after necessary legislative measures had been taken in accordance with the United Nations General Assembly resolution adopted in October,
i97o. Yugloslavia, Bulgaria, and Rumania-among East European countries-having
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expressed a desire to become beneficiaries of the preferential tariff scheme, the government of Japan decided to apply these rates to Yugoslavia beginning in August,
197i, and to the latter two as of April, 1972, by designating them beneficiaries of the

scheme.
C. Trade Agreement
Upon concluding treaties of commerce with East European states, Japan also
concluded trade agreements with many of them. However, no trade agreement has
yet been concluded with Czechoslovakia, and, while no treaty of commerce has been
concluded with Hungary, there is a trade agreement with that country. These
agreements consist of the text, with a list of export and import items attached to it,
and the exchange of notes.
The trade agreements generally provide that both governments will endeavor
to facilitate issuance of licenses for export and import transactions; that such licenses
will be issued in accordance with laws and regulations in force or to be put into force
in the respective countries; that the settlement will be made in a convertible currency; that recourse to an arbitration agency in both countries will be encouraged for
settling a dispute; that a meeting will be held to review the implementation of the
agreement; and so forth.
Among the countries of Eastern Europe, it is the Soviet Union that has most
consistently attached importance to the trade agreement. Other East European
countries have, on the whole, paid little attention to the operation of such agreements.
Consequently, bilateral trade agreements between Japan and East European countries
are of almost no practical significance. However, between Japan and the Soviet
Union meetings have been held every year in accordance with the provisions of the
agreement. The representatives have held consultations on such agenda items as
review of the trade performance during the previous year, prospects for export and
import during the current year, matters requiring improvement concerning transactions, the question of a compulsory export-import package, and the question of the
offices of Japanese trade companies in Moscow.
Both the Japanese government and the country's private businessmen have considered the conventional -trade agreement useful for several reasons, some of which
include the following:
Yearly consultation on a governmental basis is more effective than negotiation by Japanese private organizations with the government of the Soviet
Union as a means of solving the various problems which hamper expansion
of Japanese-Soviet trade.
(2) It is possible, through such an inter-governmental meeting, to obtain official
information from the government of the Soviet Union relating to the
production, as well as to the supply and demand, situation of principal
commodities in the Soviet Union, the trade and economic relations between
the Soviet Union and other countries, and possible changes in such relations.
(i)
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(3) While the quantity of each commodity listed on the table of export and
import items is merely an estimate as far as the Japanese side is concerned,
it serves as an indicator for the planning agencies, ministries, industrial units,
commercial organs, and trade corporations of the Soviet Union in their
activities concerning trade with Japan, such as formulating a program,
securing a portion of the budget, and allocating a quota of materials. Therefore, such estimate figures for the quantity of export and import commodities
can also serve as guidelines for the activities of Japanese private industries,
including investment, production, and marketing. In particular, since those
figures show the amount of commodities which the Japanese side can
legitimately require the Soviet Union to import, they are in a sense a useful
means of promoting Japan's exports.
(4) Such an agreement makes it possible for the Japanese side to obtain longterm prospects for the availability of raw materials and fuel from the Soviet
Union.
(5) Should the Soviet Union export commodities to Japan at such low prices
as to threaten to disturb the Japanese market, the agreement will provide for
protection of the Japanese side through direct negotiation with the government of the Soviet Union.
D. Trade Planning
The prospect for export and import trade announced by the government of Japan
is worked out every year by the working group subordinate to the Trade Council.
The latter is composed of the Prime Minister as chairman, ministers, and members
of the Diet (Law Establishing the Prime Minister's Office of 1949). Its purpose is to
investigate and to discuss trade policies, export targets, and other important trade
problems which require communication and coordination among the administrative
organs concerned. Under the Council, there are industry-wide subcommittees dealing
respectively with iron and steel, machinery, chemicals, textiles, and others, which
number fourteen in all. These subcommittees formulate the industry-wide and
market-wide targets for both exports and imports and refer them to the Council for
its approval. These targets, which are also formulated country-wide with regard to
Eastern European countries, are merely the objectives that Japan endeavors to reach,
and are not of a rigid or binding nature. In addition, amounts of exports and imports during the period of the agreement are estimated in accordance with the trade
agreement between Japan and the Soviet Union.
Until 197o , a table of export and import items was attached to the Japan-Soviet
Union trade agreement, and to each item were appended figures for the quantity or
value which was expected to be reached each year. However, under the present agreement, covering the period from 1971 to 1975, the listing of such estimate figures is
dispensed with, although a table of items is still attached. This change was primarily for practical reasons. That is, despite the fact that the actual performance of
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Japanese-Soviet trade has shown a constant excess of imports over exports on the
Japanese side, an attempt was made, when both governments were working out
estimate figures, to maintain export-import balances or to modify the actual imbalance
on the list of items, notwithstanding the structural nature of the imbalance. This
led to a frequent discrepancy between the estimates and the actual performance.
Therefore, the utility of such an estimation has recently come to be questioned.
Nevertheless, export and import estimates have been worked out during the
course of consultation between the two governments, even under the present agreement. According to the estimates, the total of exports and imports during the fiveyear period will amount to approximately $5.2 billion (on the basis of the former
exchange rate), and the average annual growth rates of Japan's exports and imports
are 15.9 per cent and 9.6 per cent respectively. These estimates were not arrived at
through an agreement between Japan and the Soviet Union, but were made by the
Japanese side alone. (It would have required a prolonged negotiation to come to an
agreement on concrete figures between the two countries, and such a negotiation was
not undertaken'.)
TABLE III
THE N-w JAPANEsE-SovIET FivE YER AGREEMENT (1971-75)
ESTIMATED EXPORT AND IMPORT

(FOB

BASIS)

1975

Total

Average Annual
Growth Rate

610

683

2,667

15.9%

488

538

594

2,494

9.6%

1,059

1,148

1,277

5,161

1971

1972

1973

millions of dollars) ........

379

424

571

Import into Japan (in
millions of dollars) ........

412

462

791

886

1974

Export from Japan (in

Total ...................

12.7%

II
TRADE AGENCIES; CONCLUSION OF A CONTRACT;
ORGANIZATIONS FOR TRADE PROMOTION

A. Trade Agencies
Most of the Japanese traders who conclude export or import contracts with the
East European trade organizations are the so-called sogo shosha or all-around trade
firms, fourteen or fifteen in number, the very existence of which appears to be
peculiar to Japan. In addition to these trading companies, there are enterprises of
a cooperative form which take part in the Japanese-East European trade. Their
existence and participation is explained by the fact that the countries of Eastern
Europe have trade organizations belonging to consumers' cooperatives, and these
organizations have given priority to trade with foreign cooperatives. Trade between
cooperatives has a special character in Japanese-Soviet trade in that it has a feature
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of a regional trade, similar to coastal trade in which consumer goods are the primary
items in which the Japanese cities along the coast of the Sea of Japan are particularly
interested.
All-around trading companies did not come onto the East-West trade scene until
the late i96o's. Until that time, each all-around trading company had set up a
dummy company under the same personnel and capital, and through this dummy
the company engaged indirectly in East-West trade. The change that took place is
due largely to the efforts of Mr. Mikoyan, former President of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet, who visited Japan in 1964. Mr. Mikoyan's visit to Japan was part
of the new (1966-7o) Five Year Economic Plan of the Soviet Government. Under
this plan, it sent high government officials to advanced countries to hold talks
designed to promote economic cooperation.
When Mr. Mikoyan arrived in Japan, he presented to the Japanese government
a list of orders for various chemical industries amounting to $35o million. At the
same time, he explained the Project for the Development of Siberia, and attempted to
secure Japanese investment in the project. He met not only with leaders of Japanese
economic circles through such organizations as the Japan Chamber of Commerce
and Industry, and the Federation of Economic Organizations, but he also held talks
with former zaibatsu groups of Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo, and he succeeded
in dispelling the pro-American and anti-Soviet bias which had influenced these
leaders of Japan's economy by persuading them of the great potential of the Soviet
market.
Soon after the talks had been completed, the Sumitomo group announced that it
would stop using a dummy, and that each company in the group would start doing
business directly with the Soviets. After October, I96, the Mitsui and Mitsubishi
groups followed suit. (One Japanese newspaper commented at the time that the
announcement by the Sumitomo group had been made in violatiov of the speed
limit.)
B. Conclusion of a Contract
It is often the case with commodities that are generally influenced by market
conditions (iron and steel, textiles, fuels, non-ferrous metals, etc.) that representatives
of ar East European trade organization will visit Japan and, after an investigation of
the supply-demand situation and the prices of the commodities concerned, will
execute a contract in Tokyo. Such contracts are concluded between the Japanese
party and the Eastern European party concerned either once or twice a year, depending upon whether the contract covers the demand of a whole year or of only
a six-month period. As a result, Japanese business circles are occasionally shocked
by a sudden fluctuation in business conditions or prices.
In many cases the terms of a contract are determined beforehand, generally by
each public corporation of the Eastern' European countries, and the Japanese trader
is implicitly required to sign the contract which the East European counterpart
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has prepared without proposing any changes. This is particularly true of contracts
involving a party from the Soviet Union. In such cases, the Soviet party often
makes an offer, refusing to allow alterations in the terms by the Japanese party.
Negotiations concerning technology-intensive items, such as machinery or plants,
are usually conducted by a negotiating team sent by each country to the other.
In many cases, however, the contract is actually executed in the capital of the East
European party concerned. Technical matters are dealt with first, and commercial
matters, such as the terms of credit and prices, are tackled at the last stage of the
negotiation.
The final decision to purchase in an East European country is not made by the
trade corporation alone; the future user, the competent authorities, and related
technology research institutions also play a role. In addition, sometimes the East
European party, not content to deal with a seller from one country, invites the
participation of companies from other countries, thus obliging the Japanese seller
to make substantial concessions if it is to be ultimately successful.
All Japanese all-around trading companies have set up offices in the capitals of
East European countries. (Hungary, alone, does not permit the establishment of a
formal resident office.) Such resident offices are desirable from the point of view
of Japanese trading companies, in that they provide a site from which to investigate
the local market and to acquire other relevant data. In addition, they can make
available information on their products to the host country.
Recently Eastern European countries have made adjustments in their laws and
regulations on resident offices and commercial activities of the staffs of foreign enterprises, so that foreign enterprises have come to enjoy more favorable treatment as
regards equipping of offices, renting houses for their staffs, obtaining long-term visas,
and so forth. Among the countries of Eastern Europe there are some (Rumania and

Poland) where a charge, such as a license fee, is levied on the activities of resident
staffs of foreign countries. However, there are others where no charge is imposed
at all.
Some East European countries have set up corporations which collect commission
fees from foreign enterprises as the agents carry out commerical activities in their
territory. In these countries, commercial activity of foreigrr enterprises is prohibited
in principle. It seems, however, that in a case where a foreign enterprise has concluded a representation contract with the government corporation mentioned above,
the enterprise is permitted to establish a resident office, and its business activities are
tacitly approved. In some East European countries, moreover, the establishment of

an office by a foreign enterprise is permitted on condition that the enterprise concerned renders an installing service, after-case service, and other general technical
guidance with regard to a plant export.
Before permitting the opening of a resident office by a Japanese trade firm in
Moscow, the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union considers the matter
in conjunction with the question of increasing the number of the staff in the Soviet
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trade office in Tokyo as well as the question of setting up a trade mission or a
branch office of a trade corporation in other Japanese cities. In some instances
the Ministry has refused to give official permission for Japanese firms to open resident
offices in its capital on the ground that the government of Japan has not yet complied
with its demands.
C. Organizations for Trade Promotion
There are two categories of organizations which are concerned with trade and
economic relations with Eastern Europe. On the one hand are ordinary economic
organizations which maintain relations with the Soviet Union and East European
countries as part of their activities. On the other hand, there are social organizations
set up to promote trade with these countries as their primary object. To the former
category belong the Keizai Dantai Rengo-kai, or the Federation of Economic
Organizations (Mr. Kogoro Uemura, Chairman); and the Nippon Shoko Kaigisho,
or the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Mr. Shigeo Nagano, Chairman).
Each of these two bodies has had its chairman and other members installed in important posts on the Japanese-Soviet Economic Committee, and on other bilateral
economic committees which have recently been established by Japan and East
European countries. They have assumed the role of secretariats for those committees. In this sense, it can be said that the part the two organizations play in
trade relations between Japan and the countries of Eastern Europe is not different
from the one they play in trade relations between Japan and regions other than
Eastern Europe.
Included in the category of social organizations are the Nippon Kokusai Boeki
Sokushin-kai, or the Organization for the Promotion of International Trade of
Japan (Mr. Tanzan Ishibashi, Chairman); the NISSO Kyokal, or the Japan-Soviet
Union Society (Tetsuhiko Tozawa, Chairman); the Soren Too Boeki-kai, or the
Organizaiton for the Trade with the Soviet Union and East Europe (Mr. Shigeo
Horie, Chairman); and the NISSO Boeki Kyokai, or the Japanese-Soviet Trade
Association (Mr. Katsujiro Nagai, Chairman).
Initially, the Japanese government took a negative stand toward trade with Communist countries, largely due to the Cold War. As compared to trade with other
regions, there were simply too many barriers to trade with the East in both the
export and import system and the settlement system. These included such things
as COCOM restrictions on export, the requirement of advance permission concerning
importation from countries with which Japan has no diplomatic relations, the compulsory barter system, and so on. Eventually, however, those Japanese companies engaged in trade with Communist countries realized that it was more effective to act
in concert than to depend on individual efforts in their negotiations with the
government and with other concerned quarters in their attempt to solve these
difficulties. It was through such a realization that trade promotion organizations
came to be established.

438

LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

Existence of the Japan-Soviet Union Society dates to pre-World War II. Its
sphere of activity includes not only the economy and trade, but a wide range of
fields, such as culture and education. Similarly, the history of the Organization for
the Promotion of the International Trade of Japan, and of the Organization for the
Trade with the Soviet Union and East Europe goes back many years. The latter is a
successor to NISSO Too-Boeki-kai, or the Organization for the Trade between Japan
and the Soviet Union and East Europe, founded in 1957. It was reorganized in 1966
and given its present name. These latter two organizations conducted propaganda for
consummation of inter-governmental trade agreements with the respective countries
of Eastern Europe to replace agreements made by private groups with trading
organizations there. Their other activities included maintenance of communication
and coordination of action between Japanese and Soviet authorities, mediation and
good offices in business transactions, receiving and sending of economic and technical missions, holding of trade fairs and economic conferences, and conducting
scientific research.
As trade and economic relations with the East European countries developed
and the Japanese business circles entered into the East-West trade in earnest in the
latter half of the i96o's, members of some trade promotion organizations began to
experience doubts as regards the raison d'etre of their organizations as trade promotion bodies. In the Organization for the Trade between Japan and the Soviet
Union and East Europe, a move began to abandon the position of criticism toward
the government and to establish a working relationship with it. After its reorganization in 1966, it came under the control of Keianren, and in 1971 it was
licensed by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry as a corporate juridical
person. Since 1972, it has received government subsidies for its activities in organizing trade fairs and promoting technical cooperation and research activities.
Furthermore, the Organization for the Promotion of International Trade has lost its
contacts with the Soviet Union. In February, 1967, it signed a new protocol on JapanChina Friendship Trade with the Trade Promotion Association of China. In April
of that year, the State Science and Technology Commission and the National
Chamber of Commerce of the Soviet Union severed relations with the Organization,
on the ground that portions of the protocol were libelous to the U.S.S.R. Since then,
the Organization has been primarily concerned with promoting trade with China
and Albania.
III
ScIENTiFIc AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION

The government of Japan has often been asked by the East European countries
to conclude scientific and technical cooperation agreements on an inter-governmental
basis. For instance, the Minister for Foreign Trade of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Vales,
and the Vice-Chairman of the State Science and Technology Commission of the
Soviet Union, Mr. Gvishiani, on the occasion of their visits to Japan in 1968 and
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1969 respectively, proposed to the Japanese government that it conclude an agree-

ment of scientific and technical cooperation with their governments. However, the
Japanese government did not respond to such proposals on the ground that it had
never before concluded such a comprehensive agreement. It felt that there was no
point in the government's concluding such agreements with the Communist bloc,
since individual private enterprises, not the government, engaged in such scientific
and technical exchanges.
Private organizations of Japan have concluded scientific and technical agreements
with the Science and Technology Commission of the Soviet Union. Such an agreement was concluded by the Mitsui group in 1966. It placed particular emphasis on
the chemical industry. The Organization for the Trade with the Soviet Union
and East Europe made a similar agreement in 1967. Recently, a number of all-around
trading companies have also concluded such agreements with the Soviet Union.
Moreover, the Organization for the Trade with the Soviet Union and East Europe
has concluded agreements with Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, which
are aimed primarily at receiving and sending various expert teams, holding lectures
and symposiums, and similar activities.
While scientific and technical cooperation is not directly related to usual export
and import transactions, it is recognized as an important means of access to East
European markets, which tend to be exclusive. Through scientific and technical
cooperation it becomes possible to have contact with ministries, research institutions,
and other groups which are behind the trade organizations of Eastern Europe and
which are otherwise difficult to approach. Contacts of this type provide an opportunity to perceive the trend of the demand in the East European countries.
But not all Japanese enterprises were eager to conclude such agreements. Some assumed a negative attitude toward scientific and technical exchange with the countries
of Eastern Europe for fear that such an exchange might end in a unilateral flowing
out of their technology. Others were afraid that the safeguards for technical knowhow provided in those countries might prove insufficient. This attitude was reflected
in the policy of the Japanese government. However, on the occasion of the meeting
of the Foreign Ministers of Japan and the Soviet Union in January, 1971, it was
agreed that talks would be held between the two governments for the conclusion of
an agreement, and it is expected that an inter-governmental agreement on scientific
and technical exchange will be concluded in the future.
IV
REFINEMENT OF THE TRADING RELATIONSHIPs

A. Joint Economic Committees

Since 1966, bilateral joint economic committees have been established between
Eastern and Western countries for the regulation and promotion of their trade and
economic relations. The Japan-Soviet Union Joint Economic Committee has already
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been founded, and similar committees have recently been set up between Japan and
East European countries as well. All such committees are based on the pattern that
each of two countries establishes an economic sphere, with the committees of both
countries holding a joint meeting once a year.
i. The Japan-Soviet Union Joint Economic Committee
In 1965, the memorandum for the establishment of the Joint Economic Committee
was signed by Japan and the Soviet Union. Under the memorandum, leaders of the
economic circles in both Japan and the Soviet Union were to meet once a year to
consult on various problems relating to the promotion of economic exchanges, such
as trade and technical cooperation; between the two countries. Since the first meeting
in 1966, a meeting of the Joint Committee has been held every year. Consideration
of, and negotiation on, concrete projects related to cooperation for the development
of Siberia have been important aspects of its work. (For an organizational chart of
the Committee, see Appendix A.)
2. The Japanese-PolishMixed Economic Committee
This committee was established in 1967 as an inter-governmental mixed committee, but representatives of private enterprises have also participated in an advisory capacity. The Committee, desirous of further development of trade and
economic relations between' Japan and Poland, holds consultations annually for
the purpose of (i) expanding trade in traditional items and discovering new items,
(2) considering the possibility of industrial collaboration, (3) considering the possibility of scientific and technical cooperation, and so forth.
3. The Joint Meeting of the Japanese-EastGerman Economic Committees
When the economic mission of East Germany visited Japan at the beginning of
i97i, a meeting was held between the leader of the mission, Vice-Minister for
Economic Affairs, Mr. Beil, and top leaders of the Japanese industrial circles, and
it was agreed between them to set up a standing private economic committee in
each country. Accordingly, the Japan-GDR Economic Committee was established in
East Germany with Mr. Lange, President of the Steel and Metal Trade Corporation,
as its chairman. In Japan a committee of the same name was established. The two
Committees have already held a joint meeting.

4. The Japan-HungaryRound-Table Conference
In i97i, the Japan Club was brought into being within the Chamber of Commerce
of Hungary, with the participation of major enterprises in Hungary. Correspondingly, the Japan-Hungary Economic Club (Chairman, Mr. Sinzo Oya, President of the
Teijin Co., Ltd.) was organized in Japan to promote trade between Japan and Hungary. In November, I971, the first Japan-Hungary Round-Table Conference was
held by the two clubs in Budapest.
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5. Additional Committees
Besides the joint meetings mentioned above, various economic committees have
recently been established in Japan. These committees are making preparations to
hold meetings in the near future on the establishment of similar bodies in counterpart
countries.
(i) The Japanese-Bulgarian Economic Committee, established in April, 1972.
The Chairman of the Japanese side is Mr. Hiroki Imazato, President of the
Nihon Seiko Co., Ltd. The Chairman for the Bulgarian side is Mr. Papazov,
Chairman of the Committee on Higher Education in Science and Technology.
(2) The Japanese-Czechoslovak Economic Committee, established in May, I972.
The Chairman of the Japanese side is Mr. Hideo Shinojima, President of
the Mitsubishi Kasei Co, Ltd. The Chairman of the Czechoslovakian side
is not yet designated.
(3) The Japanese-Rumanian Economic Committee, established in May, 1972.
The Chairman of the Japanese side is Mr. Hitoshi Isano, President of the
Kawasaki Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. The Chairman of the Rumanian side
is not yet designated.
(4) The Japanese-Polish Economic Committee, established in June, 1972. The
Chairman of the Japanese side is Mr. Toshio Doko, President of the Tokyo
Shibaura Electric Co., Ltd.
(5) The Japanese-Yugloslav Economic Committee, established in June, 1972.
The Chairman of the Japanese side is Mr. Kizo Yasui, Chairman of the
Toray Co., Ltd.
B. Expansion of the Governmental Role
In drawing up the Eighth Five-Year Plan, covering the period 1966-7o, the Soviet
Union held talks with West European capitalist countries as a result of which both
bilateral trade agreements and scientific and technical cooperation agreements were
concluded. Those inter-governmental agreements came to play a very important role
in guiding, as well as guaranteeing the performance of, the activities of individual
enterprises of both parties.
In Japan, however, the primary emphasis has been on encouraging and promoting economic activities by private enterprises, on the basis of a free economic
system. The role of the government in the operation of the economy has, therefore,
naturally been limited in its scope. Influenced by the government's post-war foreign
policy of cooperating with the United States, the private initiative has tended to play
a particularly important role in promoting trade with Eastern Europe, compared
with trade with other regions. Accordingly, direct participation of the Japanese
government in the trade and economic relations with East European countries has
been confined to conducting annual negotiations with the Soviet Union on the basis
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of the trade agreement, and with East European countries on the basis of the agreement on the mixed committee with Poland.
The Minister for Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union, Mr. Patolichev, who visited
Japan in September, 1I97, to sign the Second Long-Term Trade Agreement, requested in his talks with leaders of the government that Japan participate vigorously
in cooperative projects for the development of Siberia. His request emphasized the
need to insure fruition of these large-scale Siberian projects.
With regard to these cooperative Siberian development projects, emphasis has been
placed on -the development of energy resources in recent years. The investment expected from Japan for the projects has amounted to between $5oo million and Si
billion. Such large sums take the matter out of a purely private domain, and make an
assessment of national priorities necessary. They also take the matter out of the
economic field to a certain extent and place it in the realm of international politics.
Japanese industry is also hoping for a high level of government interest and
participation in the development of Siberia. This is important, as a practical matter,
because the scope of governmental intervention has become more significant in such
matters as approval of credits from the Export-Import Bank, export on a deferred
payment basis, and so on. It can be pointed out, moreover, that expectations of government participation have also resulted inevitably from the growing need to
strengthen the negotiating power of the Japanese enterprises to obtain favorable results
when dealing with the powerful state-owned trade organizations of the East Eu.ropean countries, as the scope of the projects becomes monumental.
C. Channeling Trade Operations
It is characteristic of socialist states that foreign trade is incorporated in the
economic plan as a component part. In addition, the administrative agencies of
trade are commodity-wide, state-owned corporations, and the power to conduct
trade transactions is concentrated in the hands of such corporations. In Japan,
on the other hand, a number of enterprises compete vigorously for orders from
abroad. This permits the trade corporations of the East European countries, through
which their foreign trade is channeled, to take advantage of the excessive competition
on the Japanese side. The result is that the terms of trade shift unfavorably for
Japan in many cases. Notable examples of such a tendency may be found in the
trade dealings between Japan and the Soviet Union.
Soviet authorities assume a strong negative attitude toward the suggestion of
Japanese industry that it channel its trade with the Soviet Union. They maintain
that it is a natural consequence of the socialist system that the state-owned trade
organizations monopolize foreign trade and, backed by the authority of the state,
give full play to their peculiar strength. But they insist that this does not suggest, by
any means, adoption of a discriminatory policy toward any foreign country. However, according to the logic of the Soviet authorities, it is improperly discriminatory
for Japanese enterprises to coordinate relations within an industry in order to
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strengthen their negotiating power in dealing with the National Trade Corporations
of the Soviet Union so as to avoid disadvantageous transaction terms which could
be imposed upon the Japanese through the "divide and rule" tactics of normal competition. Furthermore, if the coordination is directed solely toward the Soviet Union,
it constitutes a challenge to the socialist system itself. This attitude seems rather
odd, based on the reaction of the Soviet Union in the past to cartel activities of the
Japanese industry in its overseas business. The Soviet Union is apparently not opposed to all such activities. It seems to take issue only with cartels avowedly established to deal with it.
V
FINANCING TADE ARRANGEMENTS

A. Method of Settlement
There are two forms of settling accounts-settlement in cash, and settlement on a
letter of credit. In most cases, Eastern European countries demand settlement on the
letter of credit method for their exports and settlement in cash, after receipt of
documents, for their imports. Some believe that they settle in cash for their imports because payment by their trade organizations is considered reliable. Others
believe, however, that the cash settlement method is used for imports because the
countries of Eastern Europe want to avoid the necessity of having their state-operated
trade organizations bear bank charges for opening letters of credit.
Under the provisions of the trade agreements between Japan and the East
European countries, trade transactions are to be settled in convertible currencies. At
present the United States dollar is used as the settlement currency in all transactions
between Japan and the East European countries. However, since 1968, when the
international monetary unrest started, the trade organizations of some countries, including the Soviet Union and Poland, have resorted to the policy of including either
a gold clause or a re-negotiation clause in a contract for the export of goods of their
countries. The gold clause provides that if there is a change in the gold par value
of the currency to be used in settlement under the contract, the price of exports
should be raised or lowered in proportion to such change. The re-negotiation clause
provides for holding a consultation on the price of exports in consideration of the new
gold par value of -the settlement currency after a change in the exchange rate.
Japan's exchange control law requires approval by the government before an importation contract with such clauses can be executed. The government, for its part,
has not given approval to such a contract because it supports the IMF system and
because the socialist countries demand insertion of such a clause in order to avoid
risks only where their exports are concerned.
At the fifth meeting of the Japanese-Soviet Joint Economic Committee held in
Tokyo in February, 1972, the Japanese members -proposed a method of direct settlement in yen and ruble with a view to avoiding a loss resulting from a fluctuation of
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exchange rates. The basic idea of the proposed system, which has been developed,
by analogy, from the system of settlement in yen and yuan recently adopted between
Japan and China, is to set the exchange rate between yen and ruble by an agreement
between both parties for a fixed period of from three to six months. Each party
could open an account with a bank in the other country, using the currency of that
country. Payments for importation would be made from that account. The balances
in the accounts of both parties would be cleared at the end of the fixed period.
Thus far in Japanese-Soviet trade, an excess of imports over exports has been recorded on the Japanese side. Consequently, as Japan has always had a negative
balance of payments with the Soviet Union, adoption of the method of settlement in
yen and ruble would result in an increase in the Soviet yen account in a bank in
Japan. This method has been considered to be convenient for Japan. Recently, however, the balance of the Japan-Soviet Union trade has turned in Japan's favor, and
the adoption of the above system would result in an increase in the ruble balance.
This method of direct settlement in yen and ruble is presently being carefully considered in Japan'ese trade circles, and a conclusion will be reached before long.
B. Long-Term Credit
The pressure for credits to finance East European trade has now somewhat declined. Japan has made an attempt to cooperate in international efforts to harmonize
the granting of credits to East European countries. It joined the Berne Union in
i97o, and participated in the Working Group on Export Credit of OECD. Japan's
policy in giving credits, moreover, has been based on the matching principle, which
involves giving a credit on the same conditions as those given by other countries.
The method for giving credits adopted in Japan is in the form of a supplier's credit, that is, providing financing for the exporter. A buyer's credit, such as a bank loan
to assist payment on the importer side, is not given. As for the period of credit, it
varies depending on the amount of the credit, but generally it extends to between
five and eight years from the shipment of the cargo.
Japan does not give bank loans to the East European countries for a number
of reasons. Japanese exporters are trading firms, and excessive competition is prevalent among them. Thus, a payment ability in the buyer would unduly increase that
party's capacity to exploit the competition among Japanese firms and, hence, to secure
orders on terms less than favorable for the Japanese. Also, the interest rate on loans
to East European countries has been kept low at the expense of the exporter-the
lender-who has used part of his gross profit to bear the cost. Since it would be
difficult to amend the low interest rate upwards, it is not possible for the lending bank
td profit from a bank loan. Furthermore, a compensation given to the bank by the
exporter from his exportation profit, on the basis of a consortium organized by the
bank and the exporter, is regarded as a donation within the framework of the tax
law of Japan.
There is a clear reason why the East European countries are anxious to secure
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bank loans. Unless the buyer secures a means of payment beforehand, the exporter,
with whom the buyer has entered into an import contract, might not be able to obtain
a credit from the Export-Import Bank. Also, without such means of payment, the
government of the exporter might not permit the contract. If the contract is denied
permission by the government of the other party, the trade organization which
made the contract might even be regarded as causing an obstacle to the implementation of the economic plan. For these reasons, the government of Japan plans to
undertake a re-evaluation of its position on extension of bank loans to East European
countries in the near future.
Appendix A
The Organization of the Japan-Soviet Union Joint Economic Committee
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Appendix B
The following is a list of delegations which the Organization for the Trade with
the Soviet Union and the State Science and Technology Commission of the Soviet
Union have already agreed to exchange:
A. Soviet Delegations visiting Japan (according to specialization)
1967
(i)

Turbo-generators

Commodity inspection
(3) Electrical construction works

(2)
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1968
(i) Large-scale shipbuilding
(2) Construction of large dams
(3) Rice milling facilities
(4) Public works (construction of factories)
(5) High-pressure boilers
969
(i) -Construction of metallurgical factories and mining enterprises
(2) Integrated mass-production of pianos
(3) Instruments recording vibrations of building foundations during severe
earthquakes
(4) Cooperation for the production of scientific instruments
1970
(i) Production of synthetic sewing threads and surgical threads
(2) Production of trucks
(3) Production of chemical machinery
(4) Facilities for the production of luminiferous materials
197'
(i) Welding
(2)

Telecommunications

(3) Steel
(4) Industrial robots
(5) Mammoth tankers
B. Japanese Delegations visiting the Soviet Union
1967
Commodity inspection
(2) Machine tools
(3) Toy industry
(4) Turbo-generators
(i)

1968
(i) Electrical construction

'969
(i)

Ultra-high-pressure power transmission

1970
Inspection of construction and operation of boiler machinery
Questions of improving productivity
(3) Inspection of the production and operation of telecommunication systems
(i)

(2)
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'97'
(i) Oil hydraulic industry
(2)

(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

Visit to the Soviet Union of the students of the Trade College
Exploration of Siberia and the Far East
Large dams
Safety engineering
Machine tools
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